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IMMIGRATION LAW 
THE RIGHT OF ASYLUM: THE NINTH CIRCUIT ADOPTS 
THE SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TEST FOR THE REFU-
GEE ACT OF 1980 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In McMullen v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 1 
the Ninth Circuit held that the Refugee Act of 19801 (Refugee 
Act) requires that Board of Immigration Appeals' (BIA) factual 
findings be reviewed under the substantial evidence test. Under 
this standard, the court found that the evidence failed to sup-
port the BIA's determination that petitioner was unlikely to suf-
fer persecution if deported to the Republic of Ireland (Ireland). 
Petitioner, a former Provisional Irish Republican Army 
(PIRA)3 member, faced possible execution by the PIRA for re-
fusing to carry out the kidnapping of an American bar owner.· 
Petitioner used an assumed name to obtain a visa and fled to the 
United States. II Hoping to obtain asylum, he offered to cooperate 
with federal authorities upon his arrival'-
The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) then 
1. 658 F.2d 1312 (9th Cir. 1981) (per Choy, J.; the other panel members were Hug 
and Schroeder, JJ.). 
2. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980). See infra text ac-
companying notes 18-32. 
3. The Provisional Irish Republican Army is an offshoot of the paramilitary Irish 
Republican Army (IRA). The PIRA was formed to protest the perceived inefficacy of the 
IRA to protect the Catholic population in Northern Ireland from British Army and Prot-
estant assaults. Both groups purport to use terrorism to attain the unification and inde-
pendence of Ireland. They are not officially supported by any government. In September 
of 1974, petitioner formally resigned from the PIRA because of ideological differences. 
658 F.2d at 1314. 
4. Id. Petitioner testified at the deportation proceedings that a friend warned him 
that he would be murdered by the PIRA due to his non-cooperation in the kidnapping. 
Petitioner had had a complicated involvement with the PIRA since his desertion from 
the British Army. Id. 
5. Id. See infra note 8 for the grounds of petitioner's deportation. 
6. Petitioner cooperated with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms and 
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brought deportation proceedings against petitioner. The immi-
gration judge found that petitioner was not deportable as 
charged,? pursuant to the Immigration and Nationality Act (the 
Act).8 . 
Based upon petitioner's oral testimony' and documentary 
evidence,lo the immigration judge withheld deportation because 
the government of Ireland was unable to control the PIRA activ-
ities, and "[i]f [petitioner] were to be returned to that country, 
he would suffer persecution within the meaning of the [United 
Nations] Convention,ll Protocol,I1 and section 243(h)13 [of the 
Act]."I. Further, the judge found that petitioner was not a se-
curity risk to the United States and that therefore deportation 
should be withheld. 111 
7. In re McMullen, No. A·23054818, Decision of Immigration Judge at 1 (Jan. 10, 
1980). 
8. Petitioner was charged with violating the following Immigration & Nationality 
Act sections: (1) § 241(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1) (1976) (alien excludable at entry upon 
the order of the . Attorney General); (2) § 212(a)(19), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(19) (1976) (ob· 
tained visa or other documentation by fraud, or willfully misrepresenting a material 
fact); and (3) § 212(a)(26), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(26) (1976) (not in possession of a valid 
nonimmigrant visa). 658 F.2d at 1314·15. 
9. Petitioner testified that the PIRA was aware of his cooperation with authorities, 
and that he was considered a traitor who should be executed. 658 F.2d at 1314. 
10. "McMullen submitted over 100 pages of exhibits consisting of newspaper and 
magazine articles, scholarly reports and other publications dqcumenting PIRA terrorist 
activities." I d. 
11. The United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for 
signature July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150. The United States has never adhered to the 
Convention, which accorded protection to the refugees at that time. The relevant portion 
of Article 33 reads as follows: "No contracting state shall expel or return (refouler) a 
refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers or territories where his life or freedom 
would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a partic· 
ular social group or political opinion." See generally Note, The Right of Asylum Under 
United States Law, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 1125 (1980). [hereafter Right of Asylum] 
12. The United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for 
signature Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6260, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 606 U.N.T.S. 268. The Proto· 
col espouses all of the substantive provisions of the Convention and defines "refugee" as 
a person who, "owing to well·founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, reli· 
gion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside 
the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail 
himself of the protection of that country." Convention article 1 is adopted by Protocol 
article 1. The United States adhered to the Protocol effective November I, 1968. See 
Right of Asylum, supra note 11, at 1126. 
13. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1976). 
14. In re McMullen, supra note 7, at 5. 
15. Id. at 9. The immigration judge based his decision primarily on the United 
States' adherence to the principles of the United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status 
of Refugees, supra note 12. The relevant part of article 33 of the Protocol reads as 
2
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The BIA reversed on the ground that petitioner failed to 
show a sufficient likelihood that he would suffer persecution if 
deported to Ireland.18 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit, conceding 
that the question was one of first impression, held that under 
the provisions of the Refugee Act, the BIA's finding was not 
supportable under the substantial evidence test.17 
This note will discuss the significance of the Refugee Act, 
its influence on the Ninth Circuit's reasoning, and analyze the 
potential impact of the McMullen decision. 
B. BACKGROUND - THE REFUGEE ACT OF 1980 
The Refugee Act is a comprehensive measure designed to 
deal with the admission of refugees, the granting of political asy-
lum, and the provision of assistance to such persons.18 "[The 
Refugee Act) reflects one of the oldest themes in America's his-
tory - welcoming homeless refugees to our shores. It gives stat-
utory meaning to our national commitment to human rights and 
humanitarian concerns .... "19 The term "refugee" now means 
follows: 
any person who is outside any country of such 
person's nationality . . . and is unable or unwill-
ing to return to, and is unable or unwilling to 
avail himself or herself of the protection of, that 
country because of persecution or a well-founded 
fear of persecution on account of race, religion, 
nationality, membership in a particular social 
group, or political opinion . . . .10 
2. The benefit of the present provision may not, however, 
be claimed by a refugee whom there are reasonable grounds 
for regarding as a danger to the security of the country in 
which he is, or who, having been convicted by a final judgment 
of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the 
community of that country. 
16. 658 F.2d at 1315. 
17. See Calhoun v. Bailer, 626 F.2d 145, 148 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 
906 (1981) ("[TJhe substantial evidence test is quinteBSentially a case-by-case analysis 
requiring review of the whole record."). 
18. See generally 57 INTERPRETER RELEASES (American Council for Nationalities 
Serv.) 133 (March 20, 1980) for a detailed analysis of the Refugee Act. See also Note, 
The Forty Year Crisis: A Legislative History of the Refugee Act of 1980, 19 SAN DlBGO 
L. REV. 9 (1981). 
19. S. REP. No. 256, 96th Cong., 2d SeBS. 2, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONGo & 
AD. NEWS 141. 
20. The Refugee Act of 1980, supra note 2 [hereafter Refugee ActJ, at § 201(a), 8 
3
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The new definition brings United States law into conformity 
with international treaty obligations under the United Nations 
Protocorn and Convention.22 There is now a clear-cut distinction 
between refugees, aliens outside the United States,23 and asylees, 
aliens who are physically present in the United States or at a 
land border or port of entry.2. 
Since petitioner had entered the United States illegally, he 
could apply for asylum if the Attorney General determined that 
he was a refugee within the meaning of the Refugee Act.211 Addi-
tionally, the power to grant asylum lay within the discretion of 
the immigration judge.28 
Prior to the enactment of the Refugee Act, the decision to 
withhold deportation was a matter solely within the Attorney 
General's discretion.27 Now, however, the amended section 
243(h) states that "[t]he Attorney General shall not deport or 
return an alien . . . to a country if the Attorney General deter-
mines that such alien's life or freedom would be threatened in 
such country on account of race, religion, nationality, member-
ship in a particular social group, or political opinion."28 Once eli-
gibility has been shown, relief is mandatory, not discretionary, 
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(a) (1976 & Supp. 1982). 
21. See supra note 12. 
22. See supra note 11. The Refugee Act expanded the grounds of persecution to 
include nationality and membership in a particular social group. See supra text accom-
panying note 20. 
23. Refugee Act § 201(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(a) (1976 & Supp. 1982). 
24. Refugee Act § 208, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1976 & Supp. 1982). 
25.Id. 
26. See Matter of Lam, 18 I & N Dec. 2857 (BIA 1981). Interim regulations promul-
gated pursuant to the Refugee Act similarly provide that asylum applications made after 
the institution of exclusion or deportation proceedings shall be considered by immigra-
tion judges. In re McMullen, supra note 7, at 6 n.4. See a/so 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1981) 
(the alien may be granted asylum at the discretion of the Attorney General). 
27. Immigration & Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 89-236, § llf, 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) 
(1965) amended by Pub. L. No. 96-212, tit. II, § 203(e) (1980). The section formerly read: 
The Attorney General is authorized to withhold deportation of 
any alien within the United States to any country in which in 
his opinion the alien would be subject to persecution on ac-
count of race, religion, or political opinion and for such period 
of time as he deems to be necessary for such reason. 
(emphasis added). 
28. Refugee Act of 1980, § 243(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(l) (1976 & Supp. 1982) (em-
phasis added). 
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unless an alien is excludable under section 243(h)(2).29 National-
ity and membership in a particular social group have also been 
added to the bases of persecution within the definition of "refu-
gee." Thus, in McMullen, the INS conceded that persecution 
within the meaning of section 243(h) can include persecution by 
non-governmental groups such as the PIRA.30 
Past decisions indicate that the Ninth Circuit gave extreme 
deference to the Attorney General's decisions.31 Under former 
section 243(h), the Ninth Circuit searched only for a lack of due 
process or an abuse of discretion by the immigration judge or 
the BIA. Before McMullen, the Ninth Circuit had explicitly re-
fused to apply. substantial evidence review to a BIA finding of 
ineligibility for section 243(h) relief.32 
C. THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S REASONING 
In McMullen, the Ninth Circuit needed only to review the 
BIA's finding that petitioner was not likely to suffer persecution 
29. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(2) (1976 & Supp. 1982). This section reads in relevant part: 
Paragraph (1) shall not apply to any alien if the Attorney 
General determines that -
(A) the alien ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise partici· 
pated in the persecution of any person on account of race, reli-
gion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or 
political opinion; 
(B) the alien, having been convicted by a final judgment of a 
particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the commu-
nity of the United States; 
(C) there are serious reasons for considering that the alien has 
committed a serious nonpolitical crime outside the United 
States prior to the arrival of the alien in the United States; or 
(D) there are reasonable grounds for regarding the alien as a 
danger to the security of the United States. 
30. 658 F.2d at 1315 n.2 (petitioner must show that the government of the country 
he would be deported to is unwilling or unable to control that group). 
31. See, e.g., Kasravi v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 400 F.2d 675 (9th Cir. 
1968) (in reviewing special inquiry officer's decision at deportation hearing, court of ap-
peals could not substitute its opinion for that of Attorney General); Asghari v. Immigra-
tion & Naturalization Serv., 396 F.2d 391 (9th Cir. 1968) (there was no lack of due pro-
cess or abuse of discretion when the record amply. supported the refusal of the Attorney 
General to withhold deportation); Namkung v. Boyd, 226 F.2d 385 (9th Cir. 1955) (under 
statute authorizing Attorney General to withhold deportation of an alien to a country 
where he would be subjected to physical persecution, withholding deportation for such 
reason rests wholly in Attorney General's or his delegate's administrative judgment and 
opinion and the court may not substitute its own judgment). 
32. 658 F.2d at 1316. See cases cited supra note 31. 
5
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by the PIRA.88 Since the Refugee Act amended section 243(h) of 
the Act, the Ninth Circuit recognized the urgent need to devise 
an appropriate standard of review. The court agreed with the 
petitioner's contention that the new mandatory language of sec-
tion 243(h) justified replacing the abuse-of-discretion standard 
with the substantial evidence standard.84 Because the charge to 
the agency changes from discretionary to imperative, the court 
recognized that its role as a reviewing court necessarily must 
change. 8& 
The Ninth Circuit reasoned that with the removal of abso-
lute discretion formerly vested with the BIA, a factual determi-
nation is now required. Thus, the BIA must withhold deporta-
tion if "certain facts exist."8e Indeed, the Ninth Circuit had 
previously recognized that "if such a finding of fact were re-
quired by the statute, the decision of the Attorney General 
would be subject to review in order to determine whether such 
findings were supported by reasonable, substantial, and proba-
tive evidence. "87 The McMullen court indicated that the sub-
stantial evidence standard of review has normally been applica-
ble to agency findings arising from public, record-producing 
33. 658 F.2d at 1315. The elements necessary to withhold peitioner's deportation 
were: 
[1) A likelihood of persecution; a threat to life or freedom. 
[2) Persecution by the government or by a group which the government is unable 
to control. 
[3) Persecution resulting from petitioner's political beliefs. 
[4) Petitioner is not a danger or a security risk to the United States. 
[d. Although the Immigration Judge found all four elements present, the BIA reversed 
on the ground that the first two elements were not proven. Thus, McMullen limited its 
review to the first two elements. The Ninth Circuit court stated that it need not and did 
not reach the question of whether the BIA's rejection of petitioner's alternate 
claim-that he would be persecuted by the government of Ireland-was supported by 
substantial evidence. [d. at 1320 n.6. 
34. [d. at 1316. 
35. See supra text accompanying notes 18-32. 
36. 658 F.2d at 1316. 
37. Kasravi v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 400 F.2d 675, 677 (9th Cir. 1968) 
(emphasis added). 
6
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proceedings.38 Because the substantial evidence test follows from 
legislative changes in the section, it does not conflict with prior 
Ninth Circuit precedent.39 
In light of the new standard, the court reviewed the BIA's 
finding that there was no likelihood of petitioner being subject 
to persecution. The court first categorized the evidence40 accord-
ing to the elements petitioner sought to prove: first, that the 
PIRA systematically tortures and murders traitors; second, that 
petitioner is perceived as a traitor; and finally, that the govern-
ment of Ireland is unable to control the PIRA.41 
After close scrutiny of the extensive documentation of PIRA 
activities,42 the court was convinced that the PIRA regularly 
maims and executes informers and defectors.4a Since the evi-
dence clearly indicated a pattern in the PIRA's activities and 
since the INS did not challenge the accuracy of the evidence, the 
court concluded that the PIRA is a clandestine, terrorist organi-
zation, not subject to government control. 44 
The court further found that the burden is on th~ alien to 
prove the likelihood of persecution and that petitioner met this 
burden.411 The main thrust of the court's determination was that 
38. 658 F.2d at 1315. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 
402 (1971). 
39. 658 F.2d at 1316. 
40. Petitioner had presented the following evidence: His lengthy and detailed testi-
mony, both written and delivered at the hearing under direct and cross-examination, 
newspaper and magazine articles, book excerpts, investigative reports and transcripts of 
related proceedings. ld. at 1317. 
41. ld. 
42. Petitioner's extensive documentation contained, inter alia, reports of PIRA ex-
ecutions and torture of informers and opponents from the London Sunday Times, Time 
magazine, the Informer, Newsweek, the Los Angeles Times, the New York Times, a 
study by the Institute for Military studies, University of Lancaster, England, the Am-
nesty International Reports on the Republic of Ireland, and Deutsch & Magowan, North-
ern Ireland, 1968-74, A Chronology of Events. These reports specified names, dates and 
places of the PIRA's persecution of defectors. ld. at 1318 n.4. The Ninth Circuit stated 
that the evidence was relevant in determIning whether petitioner was likely to face per-
secution upon deportation. ld. at 1319. 
43. ld. at 1318. 
44. ld. at 1319. 
45. ld. at 1317. The BIA found that petitioner's personal testimony was not credible 
because it was self-serving. The BIA also disregarded the evidence of PlRA terrorism 
because it did not refer specifically to persecution directed at petitioner. The INS did 
not, however, submit independent evidence showing petitioner's lack of credibility and 
7
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the INS failed to submit any evidence contradicting petitioner's 
claim.48 It emphasized that the INS never seriously disputed the 
truth of petitioner's claimed history of PIRA association and 
defection.47 
The Ninth Circuit noted that the immigration judge found 
petitioner's testimony credible after having petitioner testify 
and observing his demeanor.48 The court then considered the 
judge's findings because it conflicted with those of the BIA!' 
Further, the court made clear that its role is not to make an 
independent finding of credibility,IIO but to review petitioner's 
evidence to determine whether the BIA's rejection of it was rea-
sonably supported. III The Ninth Circuit concluded that the 
BIA's finding was unsupported by substantial evidence. II! 
Finally, the Ninth Circuit recognized the plight of asylum 
seekersll8 by expressing its concern about the lack of guidance 
from the BIA in the proof required in a case of alleged persecu-
inaccuracy of his claim. [d. at 1317-18. 
46. [d. at 1317. The Ninth Circuit engaged in a lengthy review of petitioner's testi-
mony that the PIRA had specifically threatened his life, that he defected by fleeing to 
the United States, that he cooperated with federal authorities and Scotland Yard, and 
that the PIRA considered him a traitor. [d. 
47. [d. at 1317-18. Indeed, the INS simply argued that petitioner's testimony was 
inherently unbelievable because a petitioner in a deportation case is motivated to lie in 
support of his own case. The INS neither argued that the testimony was inherently in-
consistent nor that it lacked veracity. 
48. [d. at 1318. 
49. [d. Ct. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 496 (1951) (recognizing 
that in applying the substantial evidence test in a labor context that "evidence support-
ing a conclusion may be less substantial when an impartial, experienced examiner who 
has observed the witnesses and lived with the case has drawn conclusions different from 
the Board."). 
50. 658 F.2d at 1318. 
51. [d. See Carter Products, Inc. v. FTC, 268 F.2d 461, 493 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 
361 U.S. 884 (1959) (reviewing court applying substantial evidence test must consider 
evidence contravening the agency's determination). 
52. 658 F.2d at 1319. The Ninth Circuit found that petitioner's desire, expressed in 
earlier proceedings, to be deported to the Republic of Ireland rather than the United 
Kingdom, had little or no probative value. Also, the court did not refute petitioner's 
claim of possible harm simply because his family safely resides in the Republic of Ire-
land; there was no evidence to indicate that the informer's family would be attacked. 
Rather the court chose to believe that the PIRA operates under its own well developed 
code of justice, and that it is very specific in its choice of victims. [d. at 1318-19. 
53. [d. at 1319. The court noted that if petitioner, a well known former PIRA mem-
ber with an extensively documented claim of probable persecution, failed to present suf-
ficient proof, then it would be nearly impossible for anyone in petitioner's position to 
make out a case under § 243(h). [d. 
8
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tion by a clandestine, terrorist group.1I4 
D. ANALYSIS 
The McMullen decision signals an end to the often narrow 
abuse-of-discretion standard of review.&& However, the Ninth 
Circuit adopted a substantial evidence test to review BIA factual 
findings narrower than that used in reviewing factual findings of 
other government agencies.1I8 The decision could have set a more 
forceful precedent had the court delineated the test in clearer 
language and based its holding directly on the statutory amend-
ment. Instead the Ninth Circuit cited only one ruling,II7 without 
more, to guide the BIA and immigration practitioners in apply-
ing the test. Indeed the test as explained in McMullen offers 
only a vague case-by-case analysis. liS 
As one commentator has observed, the differences between 
54. ld. See United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Handbook on Proce-
dure and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status, 11 196, p.47 (1979), which reads in 
relevant part: 
[A]n applicant may not be able to support his statements by 
documentary or other proof, and cases in which an applicant 
can provide evidence of all his statements will be the excep-
tion rather than the rule. In most cases, a person fleeing from 
persecution will have arrived with barest nece88ities and very 
frequently even without personal documents. 
55. See Hosseinmandi v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 405 F.2d 25 (9th Cir. 
1969) (decision of special inquiry officer denying stay of deportation to citizen of Iran, 
who applied for stay on ground that he would face persecution in Iran because of his 
political beliefs and activities in the United States, was not an abuse of discretion). 
Under this standard, if the BIA has employed the correct legal standard and followed 
the proper procedures, its decision will stand unless arbitrary, capricious or based upon 
invidious classifications. See, e.g., Pereira-Diaz v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 
551 F.2d 1149, 1154 (9th Cir. 1977). Thus, national, domestic or foreign policY concerns 
may have improperly played a role in the BIA decisions, even though they are illegiti-
mate components of an asylum decision under the ProtOcol. See also Right 01 Asylum, 
supra note 11, at 1133; S. BREYER & R. STEWART, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY 
POLICY 184 (1979). 
56. CI. Espinoza-Espinoza v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 554 F.2d 921, 926 
(9th Cir. 1977) (with regard to the standard of review on appeal, this court has held that 
the test is whether "the agency's order is supported by reasonable, substantial and pro-
bative evidence on the record considered as a whole. "). Although this case did not deal 
with § 243(h), the Ninth Circuit, in McMullen, recognized the change to mandatory lan-
guage in the Refugee Act and made the test applicable to BIA factual findings. 658 F.2d 
at 1316. 
57. Calhoun v. Bailer, 626 F.2d 145 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 906 
(1981). 
58. 626 F.2d at 148. 
9
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the abuse-of-discretion and substantial evidence standards have 
been and still are blurred.1I9 Thus, literal interpretation of the 
formulas as applied to a section 243(h) case cannot always pro-
duce sensible or consistent results.eo Most important, the "key to 
scope of review is not the choice of formulas or standards . . . . 
The key lies in the prevailing judicial choice of what content to 
put into the concept of reasonableness. ''61 
Now that withholding of deportation is no longer a matter 
of discretion, judicial review must focus on whether the BIA rea-
sonably determined that the alien would not be persecuted upon 
deportation. From this standpoint, the Ninth Circuit's reliance 
on general principles of administrative law62 was not only mis-
placed but unnecessary. The better view requires the adoption 
of the standard applicable to the Act itself. e8 Although the legis-
lative history of the Refugee Act is silent on the reviewability 
standard,e. it does indicate the legislative intent to conform 
United States law with the Protocol. Since the Refugee Act 
mandates a factual determination of the possibility that a peti-
tioner will be subject to persecution upon deportation, the Refu-
gee Act would be a proper standard to follow.ell By engaging in 
an intensive review of evidence supporting a section 243(h) deci-
sion, the Ninth Circuit played a leading role in giving the full 
effect to the principles and language of the Protocol and the 
Refugee Act. ee 
59. K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 29.00-1 (Supp. 1982). 
60. S. BREYER & R. STEWART, supra note 55, point out that "if administrative agen-
cies were totally free to find whatever facts they pleased, without regard to the evidence 
or the reasonableness of inferences that might be drawn from the evidence, agencies 
could so alter the operation of statutes or legal rules as to effectively change their mean-
ing." Id. at 184. 
61. K. DAVIS, supra note 59, at 528 (emphasis added). 
62. 658 F.2d at 1316. Presumably, the Ninth Circuit means that under the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (1976), the substantial evidence test is used 
only for questions of fact that have been the subject of a hearing with a determination on 
the record. Since the test has already been spelled out in the Act itself, see intra note 63, 
reliance on the Administrative Procedure Act is unnecessary. 
63. Refugee Act § 106(a)(4), 8 U.S.C. § 1105(a)(4) (1976 & Supp. 1982). This statute 
provides that administrative findings of fact must be supported by reasonable, substan-
tial and probative evidence on the record considered as a whole. 
64. H.R. REP. No. 212, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 141 (1979). Ct. S. REP. No. 256, 96th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1979), reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONO. & ADMIN. NEWS 523. 
65. See supra note 63. 
66. One other Circuit has followed the Ninth Circuit's interpretation. See Stevic v. 
Sava, 678 F.2d 401 (2d Cir. 1982), where the Second Circuit reversed the BIA, holding 
that it employed too onerous a standard in requiring asylum claimants to show a "clear 
10
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E. SIGNIFICANCE 
The McMullen decision is of significant precedential value 
and therefore of importance to immigration practitioners. First, 
the Ninth Circuit espoused the United Nations' concern that 
refugees fleeing political persecution are often unable to present 
sufficient evidence to support their claims.S'7 Therefore, newspa-
per articles and other secondary evidence are now relevant m 
evaluating a claim of feared persecution. S8 
Second, the language of McMullen strongly indicates the 
Ninth Circuit's dissatisfaction with the INS' failure to submit 
independent evidence to contradict a petitioner's claim.s9 It 
therefore follows that the burden shifts to the INS to attack a 
petitioner's claim by presenting its own evidence once the peti-
tioner meets his burden of proof. This aspect of the opinion, 
however, remains unclear since the court did not specify how 
much evidence is needed to prove that a petitioner would be 
persecuted upon deportation. '70 
In McMullen, the Ninth Circuit took a positive step in in-
terpreting the Refugee Act consistent with its legislative intent. 
Indeed, Congress' adoption of the Refugee Act clearly evinces 
the United States' continued commitment to welcome and pro-
vide assistance to homeless refugees. The McMullen decision, if 
applied with reasonableness and care, can provide relief to peti-
tioners whose claims of likely persecution have merit while also 
probability" of persecution. Id. at 409. 
67. See supra notes 52-53. 
68. For the list of evidence submitted by petitioner, see supra notes 40 and 42. In 
McMullen, the Ninth Circuit recognized that in political asylum cases, it is difficult to 
imagine what other forms of testimony a petitioner could present other than his own 
statements and those of his family members. 658 F.2d at 1319. See also Matter of 
Sihasale, 111. & N. Dec. 531 (1966) for the proposition that a petitioner's own affidavit is 
usually not only the best evidence available, but often the only evidence of a persecution 
claim. See generally Note, Corolian v. Immigration & Naturalization Service: A Closer 
Look at Immigration Law and The Political Refugee, 6 SYRACUSE J. INT'L. L. & COM. 133 
(1978-79). 
69. See supra notes 42-47 and accompanying text. 
70. See 658 F.2d at 1319-20. The Ninth Circuit conceded that in McMullen, peti-
tioner was a well known former member of PIRA with an extensive claim of probable 
persecution. Thus, the opinion leaves uncertain the weight of the burden of proof im-
posed on future petitioners. It therefore remains to be determined whether a meritorious 
claim can be made with evidence not as extensive as that presented in McMullen. 
11
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allowing room for deference to the expertise of the BIA. 
Michael S. F. Yu* 
ADAMS V. HOWERTON: AVOIDING CONSTITUTIONAL 
CHALLENGES TO IMMIGRATION POLICIES THROUGH 
JUDICIAL DEFERENCE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In Adams v. Howerton/ the Ninth Circuit confronted the 
issues of whether a citizen's spouse within the meaning of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act of 19521 (the Act) must be an 
individual of the opposite sex, and, whether the statute, if so 
interpreted, was constitutional. Relying on and exercising defer-
ence to congressional intent and power over immigration mat-
ters,a the court held that spousal status under the Act was con-
I,' ferred only upon parties to a heterosexual 'marriage.4 The court 
further found that Congress' decision to limit spousal status to 
heterosexual marriages had a rational basis and comported with 
the due process clause and its equal protection requirements. Ii 
Plaintiff, an American male, and Sullivan, an alien male, 
were married in Colorado following the expiration of Sullivan's 
visitor's visa. Shortly thereafter, plaintiff petitioned the Immi-
gration and Naturalization Service (INS) for classification of 
Sullivan as an immediate relative based on Sullivan's alleged 
status as plaintiff's spouse. This petition was denied, and the de-
nial was affirmed on appeal by the Board of Immigration Ap-
peals. Plaintiff and Sullivan then challenged the Board's deci-
sion on both statutory and constitutional grounds in the district 
court. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of 
-Second Year student, University of Santa Clara School of Law. 
1. 673 F.2d 1036 (9th Cir.) (per Wallace, J., the other panel members were Tang, J., 
and Turrentine, D. J., sitting by designation), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 3494 (1982). 
2. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1503 (1976). 
3. 673 F.2d at 1040. 
4. Id. at 1042. 
5. Id. at 1041. 
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the INS.s 
B. BACKGROUND-THE IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT 
As originally conceived, the Act provided a system for an-
nual immigration quotas, and a comprehensive scheme for the 
admission and exclusion of aliens.7 In 1965, the Act was 
amended, and the former quota system replaced by a scheme 
qualifying aliens for admission based on (1) the date of applica-
tion, and (2) the preference category into which the alien fell by 
reason of his relationship to a United States citizen or resident, 
employment, skill or lack thereof. S . 
Spouses and unmarried children of United States citizens 
have long been admitted without regard to numerical limitation, 
and are granted automatic preference status. Section 201(b) of 
the Act provides for this preference and confers "immediate rel-
ative status" which qualifies for admission purposes the chil-
dren, spouses, and parents of a citizen of the United States.' 
Neither the Act nor its 1965 amendments directly define the 
term "spouse", and only one restriction on this term is contem-
plated within the Act. Section 101(35) excludes from preferen-
tial status a wife or husband spouse who are not in the physical 
presence of each other, unless the marriage has been consum-
mated.10 Thus, the Act is silent on whether or not the term 
would include a spouse of the same sex. 
A related provision, section 204(c), provides for the non-ap-
proval of preferred immigrant status to spouses of United States 
citizens or permanent alien residents who, as determined by the 
Attorney General, are found to have entered into marriage for 
the purpose of evading immigration laws.ll In conjunction with 
6. 486 F. Supp. 1119, 1125 (C.D. Cal. 1980). 
7. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151-1230 (1976). 
8. 8 u.s.c. § 1151 (1976). 
9. 8 u.s.c. § 1151(b) (1976) provides: "The 'immediate relatives' referred to in sub-
section (a) of this section shall mean the children, spouses, and parents of a citizen of the 
United States .... " 
10. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(35) (1976) provides: "The term [sic) 'spouse', 'wife', or 'hus-
band' do not include a spouse, wife or husband by reason of any marriage ceremony 
where the contracting parties thereto are not physically present in the presence of each 
other, unless the marriage shall have been conaumated." 
11. 8 U.S.C. § 1154(c) (1976). 
13
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section 212(a)(19),U the Ninth Circuit has upheld the denial of 
admission of spouses who enter the marriage relationship for the 
purpose of acquiring "immediate relative status" and evading 
immigration laws.18 
Also modified by the 1965 amendments were the provisions 
requiring the mandatory exclusion of certain classes of aliens. 
Section 212(a) specifies the various classes of aliens who are inel-
igible to receive visas, and are excludable from admission into 
the United States. Subsection four of this provision was modi-
fied to exclude "[a]liens afflicted with psychopathic personality, 
or sexual deviation, or a mental defect. "14 The phrase "sexual 
deviation" was added to this category and, based on its legisla-
tive history, was intended to exclude homosexuals. III Prior to the 
addition of this phrase, the term "psychopathic personality" was 
interpreted by the courts as including homosexuals as an exclud-
able alien class. IS Based on the Act's legislative history, the Fifth 
Circuit found, in Quiroz v. Nee lly,t '7. that "[w]hatever the phrase 
'psychopathic personality' may mean to the psychiatrist, to the 
Congress it was intended to include homosexuals and sex per-
verts."18 Following the 1965 amendments, the United States Su-
preme Court, in Boutilier v. Immigration & Naturalization Ser-
vice,18 concluded that "Congress used the phrase 'psychopathic 
personality' not in the clinical sense, but to effectuate its pur-
pose to exclude from entry all homosexuals and other sex 
perverts. "10 
12. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(19) (1976) provides for exclusion from admission: "Any alien 
who seeks to procure, or has sought to procure, or has procured a visa or other documen-
tation, or seeks to enter the United States, by fraud, or by willfully misrepresenting a 
material fact . . . ." 
13. Garcia-Jaramillo v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 604 F.2d 1236 (9th Cir. 
1979). 
14. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4) (1976). 
15. S. REP. No. 748, 89th Cong., 1st Se88., reprinted in 1965 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. 
NEWS 3328, 3343. 
16. See Lavoie V. Immigation & Naturalization Serv., 418 F.2d 732 (9th Cir. 1969); 
Boutilier V. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 363 F.2d 488 (2d Cir. 1966), aff'd, 387 
U.S. 118 (1967); United States V. Flores-Rodriguez, 237 F.2d 405 (2d Cir. 1956). 
17. 291 F.2d 906 (5th Cir. 1961). 
18. ld. at 907. 
19. 387 U.S. 118 (1967). 
20. ld. at 122. This interpretation of congressional intent was challenged in a recent 
district court opinion, Lesbian Gay Freedom Day Comm., Inc. V. United States Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Service, 541 F. Supp. 569 (N.D. Cal. 1982). The court found that 
§ 212(a)(4) was not intended as a per se exclusion of homosexual aliens because, by its 
14
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The question presented in Adams was how to reconcile the 
apparently conflicting provisions of the Act, one granting 
spouses preferential status, the other treating homosexuals as a 
non preferred class and automatically excludable. 
C. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS 
The Adams case presented two major issues concerning the 
constitutionality of a federal statute pertaining to immigration. 
The first issue required the interpretation of the term "spouse" 
within the meaning of the Act.21 If the term "spouse" was de-
fined as including only heterosexual spouses, the second issue, 
the constitutionality of the interpretation, would follow. sS 
In determining whether a citizen's spouse within the mean-
ing of the Act must be an individual of the opposite sex, the 
Ninth Circuit applied a two step analysis: first, whether the mar-
riage was valid under state law; and second, whether the state 
approved marriage would qualify under the Act. S3 
Reviewing the Colorado statutes governing marriage, Sf the 
court concluded that Colorado neither expressly permitted nor 
prohibited homosexual marriages.sli However, the court did note 
that these statutes appeared to contemplate the marriage rela-
tionship as solely being between a man and a woman.ss Yet, the 
court found it unnecessary to determine the validity of the 
plaintiff's marriage under Colorado laws. Within constitutional 
limits, the court reasoned, Congress has plenary power to deter-
express language, the section was an exlusionary provision based on medical grounds. 
Congress could not have intended § 212(a)(4) as an exclusion of individuals who had no 
medically recognized mental disorder or sexual deviation. The court noted that the medi-
cal community no longer views homosexuality as a mental illness, mental disorder or 
sexual deviation. 541 F. Supp. at 585. 
21. 673 F.2d at 1038. 
22. Id.· 
23. Id. This analysis was derived from cases interpreting the Act and its various 
provisions. See United States v. Sacco, 428 F.2d 264, 270 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 
U.S. 903 (1970) (construing statutes pertaining to registration and revocation of naturali-
zation, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1302, 1306(a) and 1415(a)(3) (1970». 
24. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 14-2-101-14-2-104 (1973).The Board of Immigration Ap-
peals has held that, in a visa petition proceeding, the validity of a marriage is governed 
by the laws of the place of celebration. See In re Gamero, 14 I. & N. Dec. 674 (1974). See 
also Gee Chee On v. Brownell, 253 F.2d 814, 817 (5th Cir. 1958). 
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mine the conditions under which immigration visas are issued. 
"Therefore, the intent of Congress governs the conferral of 
spouse status under section 201(b), and a valid marriage is de-
termined only if Congress so intends."27 
That Congress did not intent to confer spousal status to 
parties in a homosexual marriage for the purpose of acquiring 
"immediate relative status" was premised on three considera-
tions.28 First, the INS had interpreted the term "spouse" to ex-
clude a person entering a homosexual marriage.29 Because the 
INS was the agency empowered by Congress to implement its 
immigration directives, the court was required to follow the 
agency's finding. Further, there was no indication found within 
the Act, its 1965 amendments, or its legislative history which re-
flected an intent to include such individuals within the spousal 
exemption provisions of the Act. Conversely, the court found its 
support for concluding that Congress had intended to exclude 
homosexual marriages from the protective sanctions of the 
spousal exemption provisions in the Act's mandatory exclusion 
provisions. Section 212(a)(4), excluding homosexuals from ad-
missions, aptly served to reflect Congress' intent to apply the 
term "spouse" only to parties in a heterosexual marriage. 
The court further maintained that to ascertain and apply 
the intent of Congress, it was required to interpret each sanction 
within the Act consistently with the language of the other sec-
tions, and in light of the purposes of the Act as a whole.30 Thus, 
a consistent construction of the provisions granting spouses 
preferential status and the provision excluding homosexuals 
from admissions led the court to conclude "that Congress in-
tended that only partners in heterosexual marriages be consid-
ered spouses under section 201(b)."31 
Recognizing Congress' plenary power to admit or exclude 
27. 673 F.2d at 1039. 
28. Id. at 1040. 
29. The court noted its obligation to accord substantial deference to the statutory 
construction given by the agency charged by Congress with its enforcement, and to fol-
low it "unless there are compelling indications that it is wrong." New York Dep't of 
Social Servo V. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 421 (1973). 
30. See Philbrook V. Goldgett, 421 U.S. 707, 713 (1975). 
31. 673 F.2d at 1041. 
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aliens from entry,32 the Ninth Circuit declined to address the 
nature of plaintiff's claimed constitutional right and whether it 
was implicated in the case.33 The court's position of nonreview 
gleaned support from the established principle of applying only 
a limited judicial review to congressional decisions pertaining to 
all matters concerning im'migration.34 Additional support was 
found in prior cases upholding the broad power of Congress to 
determine immigration policies in the face of other constitu-
tional challenges. 311 
The court did, however, note the lack of clarity regarding 
the scope of its limited review, and questioned whether the ra-
tional basis test must be met to validate legislation such as sec-
tion 201(b) of the Act. Despite these unanswered questions, the 
court held that "Congress' decision to confer spouse status 
under section 201(b) only upon the parties to heterosexual mar-
riages has a rational basis. "36 Congress rationally intended to 
deny preferential' status to spouses of homosexual marriages; 
thus, the court maintained, "we need not further probe and test 
the justifications for the legislative decision."37 Based on con-
gressional power in immigration matters, and a rational basis for 
excluding homosexual spouses from the Act's spousal exemption 
provision, the court held that section 201(b) was not unconstitu-
tional because it denied spouses of homosexual marriages the 
preference accorded spouses of heterosexual marriages.38 
32. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972); 
Oceanic Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 339 (1909). 
33. 673 F.2d at 1041. Appellants argued that the statute, so interpreted, violated the 
equal protection clause and abridged their fundamental right to marry. This right was 
first considered a right of fundamental importance in Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 
(1978), a case involving a traditional heterosexual marriage. 
34. 673 F.2d at 1041. 
35. See Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977) (rejecting challanges based on sex discrim-
ination and denial of constitutional interest in family relationships); Kleindienst v. 
Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972) (rejecting a first amendment free speech challenge); Bouti-
lier v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 387 U.S. 118 (1967) (rejecting a due process 
challenge). But see Lesbian/Gay Freedom Day Comm., supra note 20 (per se exclusion 
of homosexual aliens from entry into United States violated first amendment rights of 
free speech and association of homosexual citizens). 
36. 673 F.2d at 1042. 
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D. CRITIQUE 
In Adams, the Ninth Circuit limited its inquiry to statutory 
interpretation. In so doing, the court cautiously adhered to well 
sanctioned notions of "limited review" and "judicial deference" 
to congressional decision-making power over immigration mat-
ters. This position carefully avoided discussion of the real issues 
in Adams-whether section 201(b) violated the equal protection 
clause because it discriminated on the basis of sex and homosex-
uality, and/or whether it abridged plaintiff's fundamental right 
to marry. The decision presents troubling questions concerning 
the use of "limited" review and "judicial deference" where con-
stitutional claims and personal rights of American citizens are 
asserted. 
The court's interpretation of the controlling prOVISIOns 
within the Act was undeniably correct. Spouses of American citi-
zens are granted "immediate relative status" under section 
201(b),89 and based on judicial interpretation of congressional 
intent, homosexuals are among the class of excludable aliens 
under section 212(a)(4).40 It is therefore not unlikely that Con-
gress intended to exclude homosexual spouses from section 
201(b) immediate relative status. However, this limited statu-
tory analysis, in combination with the practice of judicial defer-
ence, effectively assures that plaintiff's asserted constitutional 
rights, and those similarly situated, will never receive judicial re-
view. Thus, the use of limited review and judicial deference in 
the area of immigration legislation is questionable when it re-
sults in the effective denial of asserted constitutional claims. 
The broad power of Congress in matters of immigration is 
well established. In Oceanic Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, the 
United States Supreme Court found that "over no conceivable 
subject is the legislative power of Congress more complete than 
it is over [the admission of aliensl."4l This power is grounded in 
notions of sovereignty, and justified as a necessary means to 
maintain normal international relations and to defend the the 
country against foreign encroachment and danger.42 Immigration 
·39. S U.S.C. § 1151(b) (1976). 
40. s U.S.C. § 11S2(8)(4) (1976). 
41. 214 U.S. 320, 339 (1909). 
42. See Foo Vue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893); The Chinese Exclusion 
18
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policies, by nature, invoke international political questions and 
disputes. Thus, the power of policy determination and imple-
mentation must be concentrated exclusively within the legisla-
tive branch of government.48 That this concentration of power is 
well established is evidenced by the high degree of judicial def-
erence, and limited judicial review, accorded to legislation in-
volving immigration decisions. The Supreme Court has consist-
ently sustained Congress' plenary power to determine 
immigration policies.44 The Court has conceded altogether that 
Congress could enact statutes which if applied to citizens would 
be found unconstitutional.411 
Though the practice of judicial deference and limited review 
properly serve to avoid selective enforcement of important pol-
icy considerations, at some point it must be questioned what, if 
any, policy considerations truly are served if there is no real or 
apparent correlation between the exercise of congressional power 
in an immigration decision and the traditional justification for 
its use. Assuming, arguendo, the Act's treatment of denying 
homosexuals admission into the United States neither assisted 
nor abated the traditional bases for congressional power to mold 
immigration policies, i.e., maintenance of normal international 
relations, the exercise of congressional power would seemingly 
be without justification. Within this context, the traditional 
practice of limited judicial review would effectively grant to 
Congress an absolute, but baseless, power over all immigration 
decisions. The traditional practice of judicial deference would 
dissolve into judicial abdication. 
Though it is clear that aliens have no constitutional right to 
compel admission into the United States,48 the court's position 
summarily denies the existence of plaintiff's asserted constitu-
tional right to marry. The Supreme Court has confirmed that 
the right to marry is of fundamental importance to all individu-
alS.47 Further, the Court has recognized "that freedom of per-
Case, 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889). 
43. Foo Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 706. 
44. Boutilier, 387 U.S. at 123. 
45. Mandel, 430 U.S. at 792. 
46. Alvarez v. District Director of United States Immigration & Naturalization 
Serv., 539 F.2d 1220 (9th Cir. 1976). 
47. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978). 
19
Anderson: Immigration Law
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1983
326 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 13:318 
sonal choice in matters of marriage and family life is one of the 
liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment."48 Because of its fundamental nature, the abridg-
ment of the right to marry is given strict scrutiny and demands 
a compelling state interest.49 
Though whether or not the fundamental right to marry sim-
ilarly extends to those individuals entering into nontraditional 
homosexual marriages has not been reviewed by the Court,1I0 
presumably the right to enjoy "freedom of personal choice" in 
matters of family life should be afforded to all Americans. If this 
is so, the enactment and the Ninth Circuit's interpretations of 
sections 201(b) and 212(a)(4), as applied to American citizens, 
would have to be found unconstitutional. Yet, through cautious 
adherence to the position of limited review and judicial defer-
ence, the court in Adams afforded constitutional sanctions a po-
tentially unconstitutional statute. 
The court's recognition of this problem is seen in its citation 
to the Supreme Court's dicta "that a statute could be so baseless 
as to be violative of due process, and therefore beyond the power 
of Congress."111 Conversely, the Adams court noted that some 
questions pertaining to immigration matters could be so political 
in nature as to be nonjusticiable. lI11 Yet, without deciding 
whether plaintiff's claim fell within either of these categories, 
the court simply stated that the exact outer boundaries of its 
limited judicial review need not be delineated.1I8 
The statutes relied upon in Adams, sections 201(b) and in 
particular 212(a)(4), are not based on concerns relating to immi-
48. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 169 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring) (emphasis 
added). Plaintiff's claim technically arose under the due process clause of the fifth 
amendment. However, in Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), the Court found that 
the Federal Government bears the same duty to uphold equal protection guarantees as 
required by state governments under the fourteenth amendment. 
49. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 386. 
50. The Supreme Court has dismissed cases challenging state statues authorizing 
heterosexual, but .not homosexual marriages. Its dismissal of these cases was on grounds 
of the lack of a substantial federal question. See Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972). 
However, this dismissal was prior to the Zablocki decision articulating the fundamental 
right to marry. 
51. 673 F.2d at 1042, quoting Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 529 (1956). 
52. 673 F.2d at 1042, citing Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. at 793 n.5. 
53. 673 F.2d at 1042. 
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gration policies, and appear potentially violative of an alien's 
right to due process. By their nature, these statutes also affect 
the constitutional and personal rights of American citizens. 
Thus, the question presented is not merely one of congressional 
power in immigration matters, but one of congressional power, 
albeit indirect, to resolve constitutional claims of American citi-
zens. In other contexts, the dilemma of whether a statute vio-
lates a citizen's due process rights would be given close judicial 
scrutiny and these rights minimally deserve judicial inquiry in 
the context of immigration. Similarly, whether the Adams case 
presents a political question requires judicial consideration and 
recognition before it is determined to be nonjusticiable. Plain-
tiff's claim was not, however, afforded either one of these limited 
judicial inquiries. 
E. CONCLUSION 
Though the court's reliance on "limited review" and "judi-
cial deference" is well sanctioned, its position leaves unchal-
lenged the boundaries of congressional power over immigration 
decisions. More significantly, the court's position denies a citi-
zen's right to test his constitutional claim. Because the Supreme 
Court has not addressed whether homosexual marriages are con-
stitutionally protected, a review of a claim such as that 
presented in Adams could potentially lead to identical results. 
However, this potentiality does not serve to justify, nor to ex-
cuse, the summary denial of a citizen's asserted constitutional 
claim. 
Kathryn L. Anderson· 
• Third year student, Golden Gate University School of Law. 
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